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RENDERING UNTO CAESAR OR
ELECTIONEERING FOR CAESAR? LOSS OF
CHURCH TAX EXEMPTION FOR
PARTICIPATION IN ELECTORAL POLITICS
ALAN L. FELD*
Abstract: The restriction on church participation in political campaigns
contained in the Internal Revenue Code operates uneasily. It appears to
serve the useful purpose of separating the spheres of religion and
electoral politics. But the separation often is only apparent, as churches
in practice signal support for a particular candidate hi a variety of ways
that historically have not cost them their exemptions. Although the
limited enforcement by the Internal Revenue Service has reflected the
sensitive nature of the First Amendment. values present, the federal
government should provide more formal elaboration by statute or
regulation. Focus on the use of funds seems warranted, to prevent the
diversion of government subsidy from exempt purposes to political
activity. Beyond that comparatively clear line, the practical difficulties of
enforcement loom large.
INTRODUCTION
The federal income tax casts a broad net. It subjects individuals,
corporations, trusts, and other entities to reporting, payment, and
withholding requirements. It also provides exemption from one or
more of these duties for a select list of organizations. Section
501(c) (3) of the Internal Revenue Code generally exempts from in-
come tax entities organized and operated exclusively for exempt pur-
poses, including religious purposes, provided they meet three cot ICH-
tiora. 1 No part of the net earnings may inure to the benefit of any
private shareholder or individual. No substantial part of its activities
may consist of carrying on propaganda or otherwise attempting to
influence legislation. Finally, the entity may not participate in or in-
tervene in a political campaign for public office. The first condition
* Professor of Law, Boston Universily School of Law.
' I.R.C. § 501(c) (ft) (1986).
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maintains the not-for-profit character of the entity. 2
 The latter two re-
quirements condition tax exemption on the entity's limited participa-
tion in the nation's political life. They differ in one important respect.
The Internal Revenue Code restricts lobbying only when it constitutes
a "substantial" part of the organization's activities, while it treats 'elec-
toral politics as absolutely inconsistent with exemption. 3
Constraints on political participation raise a variety of issues that
engage First Amendment values, including abridgement of freedom
of speech and of the right to petition government for redress of griev-
ances. The Supreme Court considered and rejected a challenge on
these grounds to the anti-lobbying condition of section 501(c) (3). 4
The Court held that the Code did not deny the organization in :
 that
case the right to receive deductible contributions for its non-lobbying
activity. The Code simply declined to support the lobbying activity
with public funds.5
The Supreme Court has not had occasion to consider a similar
challenge to the political constraints under the clause of the First
Amendment that deals with the free exercise of religion. Other courts
have. In a prominent case, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit rejected the claim by Christian Echoes National Minis-
try that the Constitution allowed it to lobby beyond section
501(c) (3)'s permitted limits without losing its exemption. 6
Turning to the third condition for tax exemption, noninterven-
tion in political campaigns, a recent case has affirmed, apparently for
the first time, the revocation of a church's tax exemption for active
2 See generally Henry B. liansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835,835
(1980).
3
 The 'menial Revenue Code separately imposes excise taxes on amounts paid by pri-
vate foundations to influence legislation or to influence any election. The definition of
private foundations exch ales clnirches. Seel.R.C. § 4945 (1980).
Regan v. Taxation with Representation. 461 U.S. 540,545-46 (1983); see also Cantina-
rano v. United Stales, 358 U.S. 498,513 (1959).
5 Taxation with Representation, 401 U.S. at 545-46.
6
 Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.211 849,854-55 (10th Cie.
1972). Congress Etter allowed certain exempt organizations to elect to engage in lobbying
activities deemed insubstantial. as measured by the orgaatization's expenditures lin
- ii tat
function. See ,§ 501 (11) (1980). The legislation excluded churches and related or-
ganizations from the election. on the ground that church groups had raised objections
based on First Amendment rights. The legislative history specifically said that Congress
had neither approved nor disapproved the statements or holdings of the Christian Echoes
case. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION,
	 CONG., GENERAL. EXPLANATION OF ME
TAX REFORM ACT OF 1976 at 415-16, reprinted in 1076-3 C.B. 1.427-28 (vol. 2).
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participation in an election.? The United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia concluded that the IRS properly had revoked
the tax exemption. The case illustrates the competing claims of tax
burdens and benefits and the organization's impetus to address the
public from a religious standpoint.
I. THE CHURCH AT PIERCE CREEK
Branch Ministries, also known as the Church at Pierce Creek, and
its pastor, Dan Little, placed full-page ads in two newspapers, the
Washington Times and USA Today, four days before the 1992 presiden-
tial election. The ads, headed in bold type "Christian Beware," op-
posed the election as President of Governor Bill Clinton. It Indicted
three positions Clinton assertedly supported or promoted—abortion
on demand, the homosexual lifestyle, and giving condoms to teenag-
ers in public schools. It said the Bible warns us not to follow another
in his sin. It concluded, "How then can we vote for Bill Clinton?" In
smaller print at the bottoin of the page appeared the following notice:
"This advertisement was co-sponsored by The Church at Pierce Creek,
Daniel J. Little, Senior Pastor, and by churches and concerned Chris-
tians nationwide. Tax-deductible donations for this advertisement
gladly accepted. Make donations to: The Church at Pierce Creek." 8
After a lengthy review, in part mandated by Code provisions
granting churches special procedural protections, 9 the Internal Reve-
nue Service revoked Branch Ministries' tax exemption. The district
court agreed with the IRS and the D.C. Circuit affirined. 10 The appel-
late court held that revocation of the exemption did not place a sub-
stamial burden on Branch Ministries' exercise of religion)! It said
that the church did not claim that withdrawal from electoral politics
would violate its beliefs. Loss of tax exemption, the court said, might
decrease the funds otherwise available for religious practices, but that
does not constitute a constitutionally significant burden) 2 Indeed, if
the church did not intervene in future political campaigns, it could
'Branch Ministries v. Rossoni, 211 E3d 137, 145 (D.C. Cir. 2000), affg 40 E Stipp. 2d
15	 1099).
8 Id. at 140.
9 See 1.R.C. § 7611 (1986).
1° _Branch Ministries v. Rosso' 1, 211 F.34 137, 145 (D.C. Cir. 200(1), aff);40 1 7. Stipp. 2d
15 (aD.C. 1090).
" See id. at 142-44.
12 The court cited jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Rd. of E(1uatizal mot), 403 U.S. 378, 391
(1090) and Hernandez v. Conink 490 U.S. 680. 700 (1989) f or this proposition.
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hold itself out as tax-exempt," The court also rejected a claim by the
church of selective prosecution. 14
 The church noted instances of can-
didate appearances or endorsements under the auspices of other
churches. 15
 The court responded that Branch Ministries had cited to
no other instance of advertising by a church for or against a political
candidate in a national newspaper and solicitation of tax-deductible
funds. 16
 In other words, the IRS did not abuse its discretion by prose-
cuting the most egregious case.
Although Branch Ministries addressed the exemption from tax
under section 501(c) (3), the holding also implicates the treatment of
donors to the church. Section 170(c) (2), which defines the major
category of recipients of tax-deductible gifts, contains parallel condi-
tions for qualification. When Branch Ministries lost its tax exemption
its donors no longer could deduct their gifts to the church as charita-
ble contributions.
II. ANALYSIS
The court reached the correct conclusion under current law. The
Code's limitation on church participation in electoral politics, how-
ever, raises a difficult question of administration and enforcement.
The IRS has exercised great restraint in its enforcement of the prohi-
bition and perhaps the statute or the regulations should reflect these
limits more formally.
The court and both sides in the case agreed that the constitu-
tional result turned on a comparison of the burden imposed on
Branch Ministries by revocation of the tax exemption and the inter-
ests forwarded by conditioning exemption on avoidance of electoral
politics." Turning first to the burden, at least four considerations ar-
gue that the burden did not constitute a serious interference with the
free exercise of religion.
A. The Limitation Does Not Apply to Individuals
The statute addresses the political activity only of exempt entities.
Each individual member of a church may participate ill full in elec-
toral politics. When a prominent church leader acts or speaks, agency
11 See Branch Alinistrim, 2I I Rid at 142.
14 Id,	 144-45.
15 Id. al 144.
16 Id. al 144-45.
17 See id. al 142-44.
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principles must determine whether to impute the action to the
church. For most religious traditions, the religious leader acts as
teaches: In many, an utterance front the religious leader as an indi-
vidual constitutes the necessary and sufficient guidance for political
attitudes and actions of the faithful. No action by the exempt entity as
an entity need occur. The statutory conditions that rule out political
activity under sections 170(c) (2) and 501(c) (3) constrain only the
formal actions of the exempt entity or the use of its property, through
expenditure of its funds or use of its physical facilities, in order to
forward a candidacy. Thus, a minister or a lay church official, in an
individual capacity, may walk through town wearing a campaign but-
ton. Religiously motivated individuals can speak truth to power with-
out penalty. They simply cannot use the corporate form or the church
coffers to do it.
13. Parallel Organizations
Participants in charitable endeavors have long found ways to for-
ward activities not suitable for the exempt entity. The simplest consists
of the formation of a parallel organization, not intended to qualify
under section 501(c) (3). The charity carries out its exempt function
exclusively. The parallel organization engages in the other activities,
including those that might fall within the regulation's definition of an
"action organization,"" The parallel organization may seek tax ex-
emption under Code section 501(c) (4), as a social welfare organiza-
tion. The fundamental tax difference between the charity and the
parallel organization concerns donations. Donors to the parallel or-
ganization ordinarily would not deduct their gifts.'` The existence of
two organizations thus segregates the tax-favored contributions of the
charity from the nonexempt charitable activities. Justice Blackmun,
concurring in Regan v. Taxation with Representation, thought this oppor-
tunity to create a parallel organization critical to holding the restric-
tion on lobbying in 501 (c) (3) constitutional. 20
For participation in electoral campaigns, however, the parallelism
becomes more complex. An organization exempt under section
18 Treas. Reg. § 1.50k (c) (3)-1(c) (3) (1090) defines the term "action organization" to
include entities a substantial part of the activities of which include lobbying or which pat ,
ticipa:e in election campaigns.
19 Deductibility, although not as charitable gifts, sometimes may he available for dona-
tions to certain exempt o rgat tizat iot IS, suc h as cltambers of commerce. Treas. Reg. § 1.162—
28 (1995) requires allocation of expenses to nondeductible lobbying activities.
20 See461 U.S. 540.552-54 (1983) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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501(c) (4) may not participate in political campaigns. 21 The parallel
organization would either forego tax exemption or, as the court of
appeals suggested, could form yet a third entity, a political organiza-
tion under Code section 527. The members of the church thus can
send their political message, but not with the use of deductible dollars
and at the cost of maintaining several corporate entities.
C. Effects of Loss of Tax Exemption
Charitable institutions pursue tax exemption for reasons already
suggested: to prevent income taxation on the entity's income and to
become eligible to receive tax-deductible donations. In addition, state
law may exempt .federally exempt entities from sales tax. Other
benefits to section 501(c) (3) status exist. 22 But the practical
significance of exemption will vary greatly with the entity. Suppose the
federal tax law treated a church as a taxable entity engaged in the
business of providing religious services. Most churches nevertheless
would incur little or no tax liability because they do not earn taxable
income. A religious organization typically receives much of its revenue
in the form of donations. As the IRS conceded in Branch Ministries v.
Rossotti, gifts do not constitute income. Absent an argument that the
church received payment for services rather than gifts, 23
 the receipts
actually subject to tax would include investment income and little
else. Deductions would include salaries and similar expenses of pro-
viding the services. The church likely would have little or no tax liabil-
ity. Again, the burden lies not in the taxation of the entity but in the
loss of donor deductions for gifts to the church.
D. Go and Sin No More
The Code does not explicitly bar a church that lost its exemption
by reason of political activity from reapplying for exeniption. 24 The
court of appeals in Branch Ministries v. Rossotti said the IRS had
confirmed that if the church does not intervene in future political
21
 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(0(4)-1 (a) (2) (ii) (1990).
22 For example, special postal cities.
23 See Hernandez v. Comm . '', 490 U.S. 680, 689-92 (1989).
21
 Section 504 bars an organization formerly treated as exempt under section
501(c) (3), but which lost its exemption by reason of political activity, from qualifying for
exemption under section 501(c) (4). Section 504(c) contains a special exception for
churches. Treas. Reg. § 1.501 (h)-3(d) (1990) allows an organization that lost its section
501(c) (3) exemption because lobbying was a substantial activity to reapply for exemption
in any taxable year after the year in which exemption was denied.
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campaigns it may hold itself out as exempt under section 501(c) (3). 25
Unlike virtually all other kinds of exempt organizations, churches en-
joy exemption without having first to obtain an IRS ruling as to tax
status. 26 Absence of a prior ruling would put potential donors at risk
of eqablishing the exempt character of the church in order to obtain
a deduction under sections 170 (income tax), 2055 (estate tax), or
2522 (gift tax). The court did not say so, but the church presumably
could reapply for exemption if it renounced political activity.
Turning to the interests potentially forwarded by the anti-
political activity requirement, at least some of the argument turns on
the treatment of Charities' tax-faVored position as a subsidy. The enti-
ties described in sections 501(c) (3) and 170 (c) (2) receive tax benefits
analogous to subsidies, Remission of tax liability produces the same
net economic effect as a direct payment from the government. The
government properly can limit the use of its subsidy to the exempt
purposes for which the entity was organized. More affirmatively, it
properly can conclude that government dollars should flow into po-
litical campaigns only in specifically defined ways. The Supreme Court
in Taxation thith Representation and the court of appeals in Branch Min-
istri.es accepted this characterization of the tax exemption for charities
and the tax deduction for charitable gifts.
Not everyone has viewed these provisions as conferring subsidy.
Some scholars have justified tax exemption for charities on other
grounds. 27 Thus, any tax requires initial definition of its base. An in-
come tax plausibly could apply only to entities engaged in profit-
seeking activities. Excepting charities from such a tax arguably con-
sists of definition of the tax base, not tax subsidy. And although the
dominant view treats the deduction for charitable contributions as a
subsidy, dissenting voices exist. 28
More affirmatively, the restriction on electoral activities may serve
the salutary function of limiting the extent to which political cam-
paigns might deflect charities from focus on their exempt functions.
As applied to churches, if the heat of the political moment converted
25 211 F.3(1 at 142.
26 1.R.C. § 50.8(0(1) (A) (1986).
27 Boris I. Biiiker & George K. RahOrt, The Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations from
Federal !woolly Taxation, 85 YALE L.J. 299, 299 (1976); Evelyn Brody, Of Sovereignty and Sub-
sidy: Conerptualizing the amity Tax Ifxentlition, 23 lowA J. CORP. L. 585, 585 (1998).
..S'ec William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income 'Mx, 86 HAM'. L. REV.
309, 344-75 (1972), See generally Edward A. Zelinsky. Are Tax "Benefits" for Religions Institu-
tions Constitutionally Dependent on Benefits for Secular Entities, 42 B.C. L. REV. 805 (2001).
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electoral competition into religious strife, the result could damage
society and community.
III. PRACTICAL, DIFFICULTIES OF CURRENT LAW
The restriction on church participation in elections can serve
useful functions. But it operates unsatisfactorily in practice, in at least
two related ways.
First, churches routinely engage in activities that endorse or
promote a particular candidate. In communities where churches' play
an important role, the church becomes a natural place to embrace a
candidate thought to have befriended that community. If the minister
introduces a candidate from the pulpit at the Sunday service before
election day, the church gives its approval to that candidate and has
participated to that extent in the political campaign. These activities
literally contravene the statutory condition, yet the IRS generally ig-
nores them. 29
 However, if the church spends no funds to promote the
candidate and the use of its property incurs only nominal expense,
the activity arguably does not entail the expenditure of tax-subsidized
dollars in the political campaign. If we articulate the purpose of the
restriction as assuring that tax-subsidized dollars go exclusively for ex-
empt purposes, endorsement activities of this kind do not violate the
purpose of the statute.
Second, auditing the activities of churches for forbidden political
activity presents significant problems. How is the IRS to obtain infor-
mation as to whether the church expended funds for inappropriate
electoral purposes? May it review the church's accounts and its chari-
table and sacral works to determine whether the entity stepped over
the bounds set out in the statute? If the minister wears a campaign
button, is he doing so in his individual capacity (permissible) or as an
agent of the church (perhaps impermissible). Branch Ministries u Ros-
sotti presents the easiest case for enforcement because the facts are
not disputable and significant expenditures of funds occurred." Few
cases announce their violation of both the statute and one of its un-
derlying purposes with such clarity.
In Walz v.. Tax Commission, the Supreme Court upheld the consti-
tutionality of property tax exemption for religious institutions as an
2 For a description of recent electoral practices, see generally Randy Lee, When a King
Speaks of God, When a God Speaks to a King: Faith, Politics and the Constitution in the Clinton
Administration, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 391 (2000).
3°
 211 F.3d 137 (1).C. Cir. 2000).
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appropriate way to avoid undue entanglements between those institu-
tions and government. 31 Enforcement of the election campaign re-
striction in a literal way would create just such entanglements.
CONCLUSION
The restriction on church participation in political campaigns
contained in the Code operates uneasily. It appears to serve the useful
purpose of separating the spheres of religion and electoral politics.
But the separation often is only apparent, as churches in practice sig-
nal support for a particular candidate in a variety of ways that histori-
cally have not cost them their exemptions. Literal enforcement of the
provision seems unpalatable, as it would create unfortunate entan-
glements between churches and government. Apparently widespread
violation of the terms of the statute loses respect for the law.
At a minimum, further clarification and restriction of the scope
of the restriction seems appropriate. Although enforcement by the
IRS has reflected the sensitive nature of the First Amendment values
present here, the government should provide more formal elabora-
tion, by statute or regulation. Focus on the use of funds seems war-
ranted, to prevent the diversion of government subsidy from exempt
purposes to political activity. Beyond that comparatively clear line, the
practical difficulties of enforcement loom large.
31 307 U.S. 664,673-77 (1970).
